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JORGE 0. TREVIN* and J.C. DAY**

Risk Perception in International
River Basin Management:
The Plata Basin Example***
ABSTRACT
Perceptionof the risk ofmultilateralcooperationhas affected joint
internationalactionfor the integrateddevelopment of the PlataRiver
Basin. The originsof sovereignty concerns amongArgentina,Bolivia,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are explored in terms of their historical roots. The role of risk in determining the character of the
PlataBasin Treaty, and the ways in which risk was managedin order
to reach cooperative agreements, are analyzed. The treaty incorporates a number of risk management devices that were necessary
to achieve internationalcooperation. The institutional system implemented under the treaty producedfew concrete resultsfor almost
two decades. Within the currentfavorable political environment in
the basin, however, the structure already in place reopens the possibility of further rapid integrative steps.

INTRODUCTION
Joint water development actions among the five states sharing the Plata
Basin-Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay-have been
dominated by two factors: the enormous potential benefits of cooperation,
and long-standing international rivalries. Five centuries of turbulent international relations in the basin produced an environment of distrust and
uncertainty which was an obstacle for the introduction of the concept of
integrated river basin planning and management in the 1960s and 1970s.
The 1969 Plata Basin Treaty provided the first framework for integrated
development. The basin nations adopted it to "make possible the harmonious and balanced development, as well as the optimum utilization,
of the great natural resources of the region. "' The system established
*Reid Collins and Associates Ltd., Vancouver, British Columbia, V6B 5AI.
**Professor, Natural Resources Management Program, Simon Fraser University, Bumaby, British
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1. Plata Basin Treaty [Tratado de laCuenca del Platal, April 23, 1969, 875 U.N.T.S. 11.
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under the treaty includes an annual meeting of foreign affairs ministers
(FAM) which sets the policies and guides the actions. A permanent intergovernmental coordinating committee (ICC) composed of representatives of each country has a secretariat with responsibility for coordination,
promotion, and control of the multinational efforts. The scheme includes
a financial institution, FONPLATA, which finances programs consistent
with the treaty objectives.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the role of risk in determining
the character of the Plata Basin Treaty and the ways in which risk was
managed in order to reach cooperative agreements. To do so, the theory
of risk is analyzed in terms of the historical roots of international distrust
which introduces uncertainty among the nations. Thus, the historical
conflicts and the influence of geopolitical interests on national policies
affecting basin development are explored in the first section. The following section addresses the way in which sovereignty concerns increased
perceived uncertainty of the total cost of agreement for organized cooperation in the basin. The nature of risk is discussed. The means used
for managing risk are examined in the third section through the identification and analysis of risk management techniques in the Plata Basin
Treaty. Finally, it is concluded that the Plata Basin Treaty incorporates a
number of risk management devices which were necessary to achieve the
treaty agreement because of the international environment of distrust
which was characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s in the basin. Those
techniques include a nonbinding arrangement, the division of the agreement and inclusion of secondary matters, a provision for unilateral denunciation, unanimity in collective decisionmaking, and an "agreement to
agree" on the ways of implementing future cooperation in many important
areas. Although risk management techniques may be abused, or used to
delay cooperation, their most important role in the Plata Basin development process remains their function in making the agreement possible.
BUILDING DISTRUST: FROM EUROPEAN DISCOVERY
TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The discovery of America led to confrontation between the Spanish
and Portuguese for the new territories, and set in motion antagonism
which persists to the present day. The Tordesillas Treaty, signed by Spain
and Portugal in 1494, set up a line of demarcation from pole to pole 370
leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. At that time, the existence of
South America was still unknown in Europe. Portugal was given rights
to the region east of the line, which represents 2,400,000 square kilometers in America (Figure 1). This region is the nucleus of the 8,511,965
square kilometers of present-day Brazil. According to the treaty, both
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banks of the Plata River were Spanish. Later treaties and negotiations,
and the more aggressive expansionist attitude of Portugal, extended the
Portuguese domain to three times its original area. The tardy Spanish
reaction, which was to create the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata in 1776,
sufficed to expel the Portuguese from the Plata coasts, but huge inland
territories were never recovered by Spain.
Portugal, and its successor Brazil, would not relinquish their territorial
ambitions on the east bank of the Plata River. The Portuguese reoccupied
the east bank, or Banda Oriental, in 1820, after a three-year campaign
against the orientales. In 1822, at the time of Brazilian independence, it
was annexed to Brazil as Provincia Cisplatina. However, the orientales
regained control with a small army in 1825. In the same year, Buenos
Aires formally reincorporated the Banda Oriental into the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata. Brazil responded by declaring war and
blockading the Plata ports, but was defeated by the Argentines and orientales in 1827 at Ituzaing6. The British observed the Brazilian blockade,
as their interests leaned toward the side of Brazil, the more commercially
active sea power.2 The turn of the war prompted the active diplomatic
intervention of Great Britain. Britain was successful in attaining a mediator's role in the conflict. Through this position, the British procured
recognition of a new independent state on the east bank, thus ensuring
that no nation which could interfere with the maritime and commercial
interests of Britain had full control of the Plata River.3 The peace treaty
created the Republic of Uruguay, "a piece of cotton between two crystals"
for the British mediator Lord Ponsonby,4 and "the point of maximum
tension on the South American field" for Golbery do Couto e Silva, the
most influential Brazilian geopolitical theorist of this century.5
Foreign powers continued playing important roles in subsequent conflicts within the basin. Paraguayan economic nationalism and its fairly
successful state-controlled economy aroused English enmity during the
mid-nineteenth century.6 By that time, war was a common means of
opening markets. During the Triple Alliance War (1864-1870), enormous
English loans financed the war efforts of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay
which literally destroyed Paraguay. 7 The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry be2. H. Peterson, Argentina and the United States 1810-1960 at 90-91 (1964) [hereinafter Peterson].
3. Methol FerrY, Geopolitica de la Cuenca del Plata: El Uruguay como problema 39 (1973). See
also C. Webster, Britain and the Creation of Uruguay; Letter from Lord Ponsonby to George Canning
(Oct. 20, 1826), cited in I Britain and the Independence of Latin America 1812-1830: Selected
Documents from the Foreign Office Archives 66-71, 156-59 (Webster ed. 1938).
4. de Castro, Brasil y la Cuenca del Plata, in Los paises del Atlantico Sur: Geopolftica de la
Cuenca del Plata 153 (1983).
5. do Couto e Silva, Aspectos Geopolfticos do Brasil (1952), cited in Gualco, jCuenca del Plata
o Cono Sur?, in Cuenca del Plata 47 (1977).
6. R. White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution 1810-1840, at 152-65 (1978).
7. Proceso a la Guerra del Paraguay, passim (L. Pomer ed. 1968).

Winter 1990]

RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT-L4A PLATA

came the best guarantee of Paraguay's independence after the war. Neither
Brazil nor Argentina wanted to pay the price of absorption.' In turn,
Paraguay would be a permanent source of friction between the two largest
Latin American countries. Peterson9 noted the United States' concern for
Paraguayan independence during and after the war, and reviewed the
American diplomatic effort to ensure it: "Paraguay, once the cause of
allied unity, had become the bone of contention between its conquerors."'
For almost a century later, postwar Paraguay would follow a pendular
foreign policy toward Brazil and Argentina, exploiting their rivalry for
unilateral concessions, while at the same time guarding against their
ambitions. Such a strategy came to an end in the 1960s, when Brazil
became a close political ally of Paraguay. Among other contributing
factors, Argentina had alienated Paraguay with its inconsistent foreign
policies, which were a reflection of Argentina's own political instability
and the erratic diplomacy of its military governments. At the same time,
the strong affiliation that Brazil had achieved with the United States further
reduced the incentive for the Brazilian military to reach a better understanding with Argentina. The new Brazilian-Paraguayan partnership represented a strong regional block which was to have substantial influence
on international water management in the basin. This assdciation reached
its highest point with the signature of the Itaipd Treaty on April 26, 1973.
Paraguay and Brazil agreed through that treaty to build the 12,600 megawatt Itaipi Dam in the Upper Paran,, the biggest hydroelectric project
in the world (Figure 1). However, many Paraguayans considered that the
economic and institutional provisions of the Itaipti Treaty weakened Paraguayan sovereignty by institutionalizing a permanent capture of that
nation within Brazil's sphere of influence." Itaipti started power production in 1984.
In this manner, the colonial Portuguese-Spanish conflict was transposed
into a rivalry between the new independent nations, Brazil and Argentina.
Geopolitical theorists considered Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia as "buffer
states," and even interpreted the influence of the rivalry as extending
8. H. Warren, Rebirth of the Paraguayan Republic: The First Colorado Era, 1878-1904 at 58,
135 (1985).
9. Peterson, supra note 2, at 194-207.

10. Id. at 202.
11. Alonso, La Bancarrota de Stroessner: El contexto internacional, El Periodista de Buenos
Aires, July 25, 1986, at 33. The following Paraguayan opinions against the Itaipd Treaty were
published originally by the Paraguayan press, and compiled in: Itaipt: Aguas que valen oro (E.
Enrfquez Gam6n ed. 1975). They are: Colegio de Abogados del Paraguay, Pronunciamieno del
Colegio de Abogados del Paraguay Sabre ltaip4 747-50 (1973); trala Burgos, El Tratado de Itaipti
a la luz del derecho internacional 770-76 (1973) (assessment made by request of the Colegio de
Abogados del Paraguay); Fernfndez Estigarribia, Asombro, dudas e inocultable temor ante el Tratado
de Itaipti, La Tribuna, June 29, 1973,776-79; Carreras, El Proyecto Brasilefio de ltaipti:su influencia
en la economla paraguaya y en la cuenca del Plata, Acci6n, Aug. 1973, at 754-63; Montoya, Itaipai:
Un dilema paraAmerica Latina, Acci6n, Aug. 1973, at 763-70.
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outside the basin borders, with Peru inclined to be pro-Argentine and
anti-Chilean, and Chile anti-Peruvian and pro-Brazilian.' 2 A residual antagonism also exists between Paraguay and Bolivia as an aftermath of
the bloody Chaco War fought between these two nations from 1932 to
1935.
Rivers and Geopolitics
Geographical considerations have- been important in the national policies of every state concerned with securing its national interests or sphere
of influence through suitable links and boundaries. Confrontation among
Plata Basin states has been fueled occasionally by political and economic
interests of certain groups within each nation. However, two persistently
conflicting policies of basin development have also contributed to conflict.
The natural development axis, determined by regional hydrography,
runs from north to south, making the Plata River, and its ports, the vital
center of the region. This geographic reality is a major influence on
Paraguay, Bolivia, and the rest of the basin. Brazil challenged this pattern
by developing an ambitious and legitimate project of its own. This project
tends to break the basin dependence on the Platine ports by means of
man-made corridors running west-east. Such "export corridors" consist
of roads, railways, and navigation channels, complemented with efficient
Atlantic coastal ports. They reflect a thoughtful strategic plan that contrasts with the long-time inactive Argentine policies toward the development of the natural navigation corridors.
The corridors concept is more than half a century old in Brazil, 3 and
was implemented gradually until the 1970s. At that time, it was incorporated into a formal program setting out an explicit master plan. This
led to a faster development process. Three corridors, "Rio Grande,"
"ParanaguA," and "Santos," named after their Brazilian terminal ports,
have as a common feature the direct and efficient interconnection of the
basin interior with the Brazilian Atlantic coast (Figure 1). Thus, for many
years Brazilian interest in the navigational enhancement of north-south
sections of the basin rivers was negligible, as they were competitive
alternatives to its rail and road corridors. 4 This situation produced suspicion and contention during the planning and implementation of Brazilian
hydroelectric developments in the Upper Paran,. Such undertakings were
criticized in Argentina as having the double purpose of energy production
12. Gualco, supra note 5, at 46; N.J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United
States and the Balance of Power 349 (1942).
13. de Castro, supra note 4, at 147.
14. This scenario is changing rapidly as a consequence of the expansion of the Brazilian agricultural frontier toward the west. A feasibility study of extending navigation of the Parand-Paraguay
rivers northward to Corumbi, Brazil, will be completed in January 1990. Although Brazil is promoting
this project, the concept has the support of the other four basin countries. It would reduce transportation cost to carry agricultural and industrial products to the Atlantic Ocean.
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and the frustration of upstream-downstream navigation.'" The works of
Brazilian geopolitical theorists who advocated the physical blockade of
Argentine influence have been cited in support of such arguments. 6
The analysis of geopolitical decisions requires recognition of the reality
that the most influential factor affecting them, the geographical context,
is practically unmodifiable. The Parand River has different advantages
on its upper and lower courses. High elevation differences and narrow
channel sections favor Brazilian energy production. Minor elevation differences, greater depth, and larger river flows are comparatively more
favorable for navigation in Argentina. 7 Besides, Brazil is deficient in
mineral energy sources, and in 1979 it was importing 85 percent of its
oil requirements.' 8 These facts demonstrate that Brazilian development
priorities for its portion of the Parani Basin were largely determined by
such geographical realities. Integrated water management must address
the accommodation of such priorities and realities in a general plan oriented to promote human welfare and multiple use of the resource within
the whole basin. To date, this has not been accomplished.
Historical Legacy
Within the environment of distrust produced by centuries of disturbed
international relations, historical conflicts became the evidence governments used to interpret intentions and actions of neighboring basin nations. This represented an obstacle to the introduction of the concept of
integrated river basin planning and management in the mid-1960s.
On the other hand, the strong integrating forces in the basin are the
technical and economic benefits of integration, common historical origins,
and cultural and linguistic links. All of these positive factors require,
however, the catalytic effect of an adequate political environment in order
to overcome the influence of long-standing rivalries. The absence of such
an environment during the 1960s and 1970s made historical conflicts a
critical factor in the Plata Basin development process.
THE PERCEIVED RISK OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Cooperation and Competition
Authors who have analyzed the Plata Basin development process can
be divided into two broad groups: those who analyzed it as an experiment
in cooperation, and those who analyzed it as a case of conflict. The first
15. 1. Rojas, La ofensiva geopolftica Brasilefia en la Cuenca del Plata 37, 56, 62 (1979). See
also Boscovich, La Argentina en la cuenca del Plata, in Los paises del Athlntico Sur: Geopolftica
de la cuenca del Plata 107 (1983).
16. M. Travassos, Proyecci6n Continental del Brasil (CIrculo Militar Argentino, 1941); G. do
Couto e Silva, Geopolftica del Brasil 116 (1978), quoted in 1. Rojas, supra note 15.
17. Boscovich, supra note 15, at 76-77.
18. Instituto Para la integraci6n de Amdrica Latina (INTAL), Inventario de proyectos de integraci6n energ~tica en la cuenca del Plata 10 (Apr. 1985) [hereinafter INTAL I.
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group includes mainly resource development analysts, either from the
basin countries or other nations. 9 Probably most or all of them were

aware of underlying conflictive situations, but for some reason they did
not deal with them as a priority. The authors of these papers avoided
conflict management or resolution, which are outside their scientific or
technical fields, because conflict relates to behavioral and political sciences rather than to the geographical, economic, and juridical analyses
which generally support the study of basin development topics. Also, as

cooperation is a requirement of optimization, a concept highly priced by
applied sciences, it is almost taken for granted in most studies. Many
experts, used to searching for objective facts, tend to miss aspects of
international conflict which are essentially subjective relationships. These
matters are also carefully avoided in studies prepared by international
agencies involved with the affected nations.
The second group is comprised of geopolitical theorists of the basin
countries. 0 In this case only conflict is considered. Any possible cooperation always has a strategic value, and it generally serves to protect a

nation from a circumstantial or historical geopolitical rival, or to undermine the influence of its competitor.
Legal analyses made by Barberis, 2" and others compiled by the Organization of American States,22 are technical papers. Therefore this classification does not apply to them or to hydrological, environmental, or
engineering studies.
Two cases break these patterns to some extent. Hayton discussed both
the secular conflicts and the potential for cooperation. 3 Unfortunately,
his paper preceded all the developments of the last two decades, including

the Plata Basin Treaty. Cano chronicled conflicts within the system established by the treaty, and spelled out the technical and economic ad-

vantages of cooperation.

4

Regarding conflicts, Cano discussed the

19. Levin, The Development Program of the Rio de la Plata Basin, 6(4) J.Developing Areas
493 (1972); Day, International Management of the River Plate Basin (paper prepared for UNDP/
UN Interregional Seminar on River Basin and lnterbasin Development, Budapest, Hungary, Sept.
16-26, 1975); Day, The Plate River Basin, Environmental Effects of Complex River Development
(G. White ed. 1977); INTAL, Sistema de lacuenca del Plata: Altemativas organizativas (Aug. 1985)
[hereinafter INTAL 111; A. Cespedes, Integraci6n y desarrollo de lacuenca del Plata: Historia de
FONPLATA (Universidad Mayor de San Francisco Xavier 1986).
20. Abadie Aicardi, Antecedentes histdricos y marco geopolftico de a cuenca, Cuenca del Plata
(1977); de Castro, supra note 4; 1. Rojas, supra note 15; 1.F. Rojas, Intereses argentinos en [a cuenca
del Plata (1974); M. Travassos, supra note 16; G. do Couto e Silva, supra note 16.
21. Barberis, El aprovechamiento industrialy agricola de los rios de [a cuenca del Plata y el
derecho internacional, Cuenca del Plata (1977).
22. Organization of American States, Secretary General, La Plata River Basin Juridicial and
Insitutional Aspects of Multinational Development (1969).
23. Hayton, The Plata Basin, in The Law of International Drainage Basins (A. Garretson ed.

1967).
24. Cano, Argentina, Brazil, and the de la Plata River Basin: A Summary Review of their Legal
Relationship, in Water in a Developing World: The Management of a Critical Resource (A. Utton
andL. Teclaffed. 1978) [hereinafter Cano (1978)]; Cano, The "Del Plata"Basin:Summary Chronicle
of Its Development Process and Related Conflicts (paper written for Seminar on International River
Basin Conflict Management, Laxenburg, Austria, Sept. 22-25, 1986) [hereinafter Cano (1986)].
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legitimacy of each side in the controversies. That is one possible approach
to conflicts, aimed at answering certain important questions. This article,
on the other hand, does not attempt to establish whose positions are
reasonable. Rather, it assumes conflict as a process in which every side
acts rationally according to its perceptions and interests. Joint action and
open discussion are the best ways to test perceptions against reality. Some
means to overcome obstacles to joint international action are analyzed
below.
Despite the polarization of analyses, few real-life situations are purely
cooperative or competitive. In most cases, they involve a complex set of
goals in which the participants are cooperatively and competitively linked.
Thus, some cooperative international actions produced quantifiable benefits in the Plata Basin. Such is the case of several bilateral undertakings
on boundary rivers. However, the existence of competitive historical
relationships resulted in increased uncertainty over the national costs of
more organized international cooperation. This uncertainty, perceived by
the basin countries but not necessarily based on fact, leads to an analysis
of the problem of risk.
Risk as an Obstacle to International Agreement
International agreements are the principal means of cooperation between nations. Agreements, however, frequently involve risks, and nations are reluctant to enter into accords involving substantial risks.25 Risk,
or the chance of experiencing harm or loss, is one of the most important
obstacles to achieving agreements. LeMarquand, studying the politics of
cooperation in international rivers, built a matrix that relates the variables
affecting decisions with the three broad options which are open to governments pondering the prospect of international cooperation: international, national, and status quo.26 These three options represent the
convenience of either seeking international agreement with neighboring
states for joint development, developing a national plan for the resource
without international agreement, or retaining the status quo and doing
nothing. The variables acting upon these alternatives are influenced by
uncertainty factors which affect both benefits and costs. Cost uncertainty,
which could result in a nation experiencing a net loss, is what Bilder
describes as a risk.27 The following analysis of the risk problem and its
management under the Plata Basin Treaty is largely based on Bilder's
work, Managing the Risks of InternationalAgreement, which is the first
comprehensive survey of risk-management techniques in international
agreements.
The economic, technical, legal, and political benefits of cooperation
in the Plata Basin are common to every international river basin in the
25. R. Bilder, Managing the Risks of International Agreement 3 (1981).
26. D. LeMarquand, International Rivers: The Politics of Cooperation 137-38 (1977).
27. R. Bilder, supra note 25, at 11-18.
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world.2" The specific advantages of joint action and coordination in the
design and operation of major hydroelectric projects in the Upper Paran~i
have been technically discussed by several authors.' z However, the net
economic benefits of the Upper Paran, projects have not been maximized
because of a lack of productive cooperation.3" Thus, increasing the benefits of some national and binational projects was preferred by Brazil and
Paraguay to maximizing aggregate international benefits through an appropriate coordination of all projects. This last option was technically
and economically reasonable, but was discarded. It would have involved
a redistribution of benefits in the form of international payments, either
as cash, energy, or services. Clearly, some nations did not trust others
and perceived such a cooperative scheme as risky.
The risk of international cooperation, or of agreements to implement
cooperation, has a large subjective component. As Bilder observed:
Typically, risk will be thought of in terms of general probabilities,
or chances, although these probabilities will often reflect only the
roughest kinds of judgments or visceral hunches. Moreover, a nation's decisions concerning international agreements will be influenced, if at all, by its perceptionsand beliefs concerning the presence
of uncertainty and risk rather than by the facts as they actually exist.3
A large part of the total risk perceived by basin states during the negotiation of the system finally established by the Plata Basin Treaty was
based on that kind of subjective judgment. Due to its subjective nature,
such truly significant risk was played down in the more "objective"
analyses of the system mentioned above.
Risk and Agreement in the Basin
Risk was associated, in some nations of the basin more than in others,
with loss of sovereignty which supposedly might facilitate competitor
nations attaining certain objectives related to their geopolitical goals.
Thus, the treaty reference to "balanced development" led some smaller
nations to consider whether that implied the perpetuation of existing
development inequalities. 2 Likewise, the term "optimum utilization,"
also included in the treaty, made a Paraguayan foreign minister reject
"any intent of joint action looking toward any optimization of results
28. Dep't of Int'l Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, Integrated River Basin Development, U.N. Doc. E/3066/Rev. l (1970) [hereinafter United Nations].
29. Fuschini Mejfa, Aprovechamientos hidroelofctricos posibles en el Alto Parand, ABC Color
(Nov. 1972), reprintedin I.F. Rojas, supra note 20, at 271-98; Breide Obeid, El Cah6n del Guaird,
in 1. Rojas, supra note 15, at 145-53; Cano (1978), supra note 24, at 143-46; Cano (1986), supra
note 24, at 24-26.
30. Cano (1986), supra note 24, at 24-26.
31. R. Bilder, supra note 25, at 13 (emphasis in original).
32. INTAL 11, supra note 19, at 17.
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which might affect the sovereign right of each state to the use of the
natural resources within its territory."3 3 Sovereignty concerns also led
Brazil to reject the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers. 4 Argentina, as a downstream riparian, had the strongest
incentive to reach an agreement on integrated development, as it perceived
its main risk as Brazil's hydroelectric undertakings on the Parang which
might affect the river regime and its downstream uses. Agreement, in
that particular case, would diminish risk. On the other hand, it would
increase risk from the perspective of the Brazilian government if Argentina
could use the treaty to control Brazil's energy programs as well as to
counteract its export corridors scheme. Concern for sovereignty, common
to any international agreement, was reinforced in the Plata Basin case by
the historical rivalries and the low level of trust among the basin nations.
Distrust produced uncertainty and introduced risk as a factor in the decisionmaking process. The prospect of having some development decisions taken outside the control of national authorities was considered to
be a large risk, given the political climate in the basin during the 1960s
and 1970s.
Each basin nation had three main possible options as it considered the
prospect of a cooperative agreement involving risks perceived as important. First, it could refuse to enter into an agreement; second, it could
overcome its concern for risk simply by trusting its partners; and third,
it could deal with the problem of risk by introducing into the agreement
specific risk-management provisions which reduce its perception of risk
to an acceptable point. These options are considered below.
The first option, not entering into the agreement, introduces other risks
and opportunity costs. In this case, a nation loses the benefits that it would
otherwise have achieved through the proposed cooperation.35 In the Plata
Basin case, the support that the proposed scheme received from international agencies from its beginnings raised the possibility of a significant
flow of monetary aid from the Inter-American Development Bank, the
World Bank, and other financial institutions. The Lower Mekong precedent reinforced this belief.36 Refusing agreement would be equivalent
33. Sapena Pastor, Nota del gobierno argentino y respuesta Paraguaya sobre aprovechamiento
de los recursos del Rio Parana:Respuesta paraguaya, in Patria (May 19, 1973), reprinted in E.
Enriquez Gamon ed., supra note 1I,at 693-97.
34. Azeredo da Silveira, Exposicidn del representante del Brasil ante el Comiti Intergubernamental Coordinador de los Palses de la Cuenca del Plata (Apr. 2, 1970) (unpublished manuscript).
35. R. Bilder, supra note 25, at 15.
36. The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) initiated the
Mekong River Development Project in 1957, and called for multilateral cooperation to promote the
integrated management of the Lower Mekong Basin. With this purpose, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia,
and South Vietnam subsequently established a joint commission that during its early years received
strong support from several international agencies. Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam continue to cooperate.
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to foregoing this potential benefit. All the concrete advantages of true
cooperation and joint action would also be missed. Finally, a negative
attitude would hurt a nation's position in negotiating future agreements
with these or other neighbors. In the case of Brazil, its circumstance as
downstream riparian in the Amazon Basin would lead it eventually to
seek agreement with other Amazon states for the development of that
basin. Those countries might use Brazilian arguments in the Plata to reject
potential agreement with Brazil in the Amazon.
The trust alternative, option two, is simple, low cost, and based on
moral and legal norms accepted by most societies. 37 Unfortunately, there
was a low level of trust among basin governments at the time of negotiating the treaty. In the late sixties, military governments held power in
four of the five basin states. In some cases, neighboring states were
considered potential enemies by the national military leaders. Argentina
and Bolivia had typical military regimes. The Argentine armed forces
had taken over in June 1966, three weeks after the invitation to the basin
states by Arturo Illia's democratic Argentine government to establish the
system. Paraguay was under the pseudodemocracy of Alfredo Stroessner,
an army general who was ousted in 1989 after being in power for 34
years. Brazil had an artificial two-party system imposed upon the country
by the military, who also retained the presidential post. Only Uruguay
was a democracy, until 1973. Deutsch, reporting on experimental studies
of trust and suspicion, notes that individuals who tend to be more authoritarian, less intellectually sophisticated, less liberal in their political
views, and more cynical concerning human nature, are more likely to be
distrustful and untrustworthy, or exploitatively oriented.3" Deutsch considers these results in accord with the conception of the "antidemocratic
personality." 39 Deutsch's analysis appears to be applicable to the Plata
Basin during the 1960s to the 1980s, when a great deal of suspicion and
antagonism existed among the basin nations which made multilateral
cooperative actions impossible.
Option three required more negotiation than other alternatives, but it
was the choice the basin countries found most viable. The advantages of
reaching a cooperative agreement, or the disadvantages of rejecting it,
in addition to the paucity of experience in cooperating with each other
and the mutual distrust of the five governments, led the basin states to
adopt broad risk management techniques. By incorporating these techniques as provisions into the Plata Basin Treaty, they controlled and
limited their risks, and their apprehensions were sufficiently allayed to
forge a cooperative scheme. As long as they are not interpreted as an end
37. R. Bilder, supra note 25, at 17.
38 M. Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes 203-08
(1973).
39. Id. at 207.
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in themselves, nor affect the substance of the agreement, these techniques
are useful tools for making cooperation possible. An analysis of their role
in the treaty follows.
RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN THE PLATA BASIN TREATY
Risk management techniques differ in their nature and application.
Specific problems often require specific risk management strategies. When
the cause or nature of the risk is difficult to identify or when to do so
would be undiplomatic, techniques which broadly control risks are used. '
Broad clauses of this type were included in the Plata Basin Treaty as
described below.
While these techniques can remove obstacles to agreement, they also
have limitations. 4 They cannot control risks completely, and therefore a
certain level of trust is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of international agreements. They may also be abused, used to delay cooperation,
or disguise what are in fact treaty violations. Furthermore, these techniques are a sign of distrust, and as such they may generate more distrust
and suspicion. Risk management is not an end in itself but is relevant
insofar as it contributes to reaching substantive agreement. The following
techniques were adopted in the Plata Basin Treaty to manage risk.
Nonbinding Arrangement
Article V of the Plata Basin Treaty reads as follows:
Any joint activities undertaken by the Contracting Parties shall be
carried out without prejudice to such projects and undertakings as
they may decide to execute within their respective territories, in
accordance with respect for international law and fair practice among
neighbouring friendly nations.42
In a legal analysis, Barberis observes that article V defers definition on
the legality of any unilateral action to international law; therefore the
treaty does not establish any new "material" juridical norm regarding the
administration of the basin waters.43 This article introduced a nonbinding
provision into the treaty. The nonbinding intention is clear, although
questions may arise as to the reason it was not expressed in a more direct
manner. Schachter asserts that governments tend to be reluctant to state
explicitly in an agreement that it is nonbinding or lacks legal force.'
The nonbinding character of an agreement basically means that non40. R. Bilder, supra note 25, at 23-24.
41. Id. at 195-205.
42. Plata Basin Treaty, supra note 1, at art. V.
43. Barberis, supra note 21, at 75.
44. Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 Am. J. Int'l
L. 296, 297 (1977).
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compliance by a party would not be adequate grounds for claiming reparation or judicial remedies. It is quite a different matter, however, to
assert that the parties are free to act as if the treaty does not exist, or to
deny the value of an agreement as a means of achieving cooperation. As
Bilder observes, the agreement enables each signatory nation to establish
what is expected that it and the others will do, and provides the normative
foundations which support these expectations.4" Schachter concludes that
such agreements represent a political commitment which implies, and
eventually gives rise to, internal or administrative responses which are
often specific acts.' At the same time, the fact that the governments have
entered into mutual engagements entitles each state to make representations to the others on the execution of those engagements.
In the case of the Plata Basin, the political environment existing in the
1960s made it impossible to attain a binding agreement for integrated
development. The resulting treaty was, nevertheless, better than no agreement at all. The treaty established an initial institutional framework to
facilitate future cooperation, and it created political and moral expectations so that noncompliance creates certain political risks for any nation
that chooses not to honor the agreement. The lengthy process of treaty
negotiation and adoption illustrates the fact that the basin nations took
the agreement seriously. The negotiation process started in 1966. ICC
submitted the final draft for approval by the governments in 1968. It was
signed in April of 1969. Still, ratification took six months for Brazil
(October 1969), ten months for Paraguay (February 1970), one year and
one month for Argentina and Uruguay (May 1970), and one year and
three months for Bolivia (July 1970). Thus, the treaty did not become
operative until August 1970.
Agreement to Agree
The Plata Basin Treaty is basically an agreement to cooperate in a
number of areas set forth in article I. Goal-directed behavior and rewards
for each participant are viewed as central elements of cooperation by
almost all writers.4 From these two elements, at least the latter necessarily
involves an agreement process which is essentially dynamic, as it has to
be applied to new or changing activities emerging in the course of cooperation. The basin nations, then, have "agreed to agree" on ways of
implementing such cooperation, particularly in regard to the distribution
of tasks and payoffs. They reached a detailed agreement on a coordination
mechanism. This was achieved by ratifying ICC as a permanent institution
45.
46.
47.
48.

R. Bilder, supra note 25, at 26.
Schachter, supra note 44, at 303-04.
Plata Basin Treaty, supra note I.
G. Marwell & D. Schmitt, Cooperation: An Experimental Analysis 6 (1975).
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and approving its statute.49 In all other aspects, the countries committed
themselves to negotiate future common basin problems in good faith.
ll6 identifies "residual disagreement" as unresolved issues which are
neither extraneous to the subject of agreement nor trivial, and points out
that in most agreements a significant amount of disagreement remains.'
The "agreement to agree" component of the Plata Basin Treaty indicates that the nations were not prepared to engage themselves fully in
more substantive obligations in the areas covered by the treaty, excluding
the institutional coordination scheme. In this regard, the treaty committed
the basin countries to a compromise to cooperate in the areas in question,
while establishing a framework which could permit and facilitate the
resolution of specific aspects of their cooperative action. As such, the
value of the treaty and the institutional system that it established is undeniable. No treaty, nor any associated institutional scheme, can produce
cooperation by itself. Therefore no assessment of the treaty should be
undertaken on such a basis.
Division of the Agreement and Inclusion of Secondary Matters
During the negotiation of the treaty it was clear for the Plata Basin
governments that the use of the rivers was a very sensitive issue. Because
of this, the governments introduced into the treaty other matters that could
be resolved by consensus. The Plata Basin Treaty is an enlarged agreement, divided into what practically represents a number of more limited
agreements on both critical and secondary items. Article I of the treaty
identifies these objectives:
The Contracting Parties agree to join forces to promote the harmonious development and physical integration of the River Plate Basin
and its zones of direct and measurable influence.
To that end, they shall promote, in the region of the Basin, the
identification of areas of mutual interest, the carrying out of studies,
plans and works and the formulation of such operating arrangements
and legal instruments as they may deem necessary to achieve the
following objectives:
(a) Facilitation and assisting navigation;
(b) The rational utilization of water resources, in particular by regulation of watercourses and their multipurpose and equitable
development;
(c) The conservation and development of animal and plant life;
(d) The improvement of road, rail, river, air, electrical and telecommunications interconnexions;
49. Plata Basin Treaty, supra note 1, at art. III, para. 1.
50. F. IkM6, How Nations Negotiate 16-22 (1964).
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(e) Regional complementarity, by promoting and establishing industries for the development of the Basin;
(f) The economic complementarity of areas bordering on the Basin;
(g) Co-operation with respect to education, health and disease control;
(h) The promotion of other projects of mutual interest, in particular
those relating to the surveying, evaluation and development of
the natural resources of the area;
(i) Acomprehensive knowledge of the River Plate Basin."'
Thus, a large cooperative arrangement was segmented in the Plata
Basin case into a series of separate agreements. According to Bilder,
segmenting techniques of this type are commonly used with risk management purposes." 2 It is expected that each nation can then reassess the
value and risks of continued cooperation on the basis of its experience
with particular segments of the cooperative scheme.
The search for agreement on less risky subjects is a technique used to
build a working relationship and thus reduce risk perception by the parties.
Negotiation experts53 and most water development specialists' recognize
that changes of this type in the scope of agreements may make them more
manageable.
Once the treaty was signed, secondary matters such as health, transportation, and commerce, prevailed in the agenda and became the subjects
of many resolutions. The level of implementation was low, however, as
those topics were under jurisdiction of other national and international
agencies which were more appropriate forums for their treatment. Cano
asserts that the inclusion in the treaty of a broad range of subjects unrelated
to water resource development was a primary cause of inefficiency in the
institutional system. He claims they created even more areas of friction.5"
On the other hand, this diversity of objectives is consistent with the
concept of integrated river basin development promoted by the United
Nations.56 The UN approach favors an enlarged perspective which relates
basin plans to national and international economic plans directed at achieving
economic growth and improved social welfare.57 The Plata Basin experience does not demonstrate that this comprehensive approach caused the
poor cooperative results achieved within the treaty framework, nor does
it demonstrate that such an approach was conducive to harmonious international relations. Indeed, this strategy did not lead to more specific
51. Plata Basin Treaty, supra note 1.
52. R. Bilder, supra note 25, at 55-56.

53.
54.
55.
56.

R. Fisher & W. Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In 72-73 (1987).
United Nations, supra note 28, at 37.
Cano (1978), supra note 24, at 142.
United Nations, supra note 28, passim.

57. Id. at ix.
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agreements among the basin nations on critical issues related to river use
and management which were the main objective of the treaty.
Requirement of Unanimity in Collective Decisionmaking
According to the Plata Basin Treaty, FAM meeting decisions always
require the unanimous vote of the five countries.5" The treaty also ratified
the ICC Statute which had been approved in 1968 in Santa Cruz de la
Sierra. Article 11 of the ICC statute established that all ICC decisions
require an affirmative vote by each representative. Thus, each basin country is assured that no collective actions or decisions will be taken without
its approval.
This assurance is widely used in international agreements, and is a
reasonable stance for sovereign nations to adopt. Its extension to procedural bureaucratic questions, however, is inappropriate. 59 A recent INTAL study suggested maintenance of the unanimity requirement in FAM
meetings.' For the ICC, however, it recommended elimination of this
requirement in decisions concerning contracting, scheduling, and administration which could be made by majority decision. This would not
increase national risk and would make the system more flexible, adaptive,
and responsive.
Provision for Unilateral Denunciation
The Plata Basin Treaty establishes that:
A Contracting Party shall notify the other Contracting Parties of its
intention to denounce this Treaty at least 90 days before it formally
transmits its instrument of denunciation to the Government of the
Federative Republic of Brazil. Once the treaty has been formally
denounced, it shall cease to have effect, so far as the Contracting
Party denouncing it is concerned, within one year.6
This clause gives each nation the right to unilaterally decide the duration
of its agreement. No condition, such as the occurrence of specified circumstances, is attached. No cause or explanation is requested, nor is any
review contemplated. Only a period of prior notice is required.
Bilder says that broad withdrawal provisions are widely used, giving
nations the necessary flexibility to induce them to participate in otherwise
risky agreements. He suggests that the absence of a withdrawal provision
58.
59.
60.
61.

Plata Basin Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 11,para. 3.
Cano (1978), supra note 24, at 143.
INTAL II, supra note 19, at 52.
Plata Basin Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VIII, para. 3.
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is not likely to produce compliance by a party which feels that its interests
are harmed and wishes to withdraw.62
Withdrawal from the Plata Basin Treaty would have implications for
a state which are similar to those mentioned above in the analysis of the
nonagreement option.6" This strategy could affect its future negotiations
and cooperative agreements with the other nations. If a party is particularly
negatively affected by a provision, a treaty revision would probably be
proposed rather than unilateral withdrawal.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Simultaneous cooperation and competition processes in the Plata Basin
are a reflection of the technical and economic advantages of cooperation
and the existence of historical rivalries. Those rivalries resulted in sovereignty concerns which led some nations to interpret certain integrating
actions as risky. Within this context, attainment of the first broad cooperative agreement among Plata nations for integrated basin development
became a difficult enterprise.
Implementing international cooperation requires as an early step the
establishment of an agreement which should specify objectives and the
means of joint action. In the Plata Basin case, the Plata Basin Treaty is
that instrument. Its goal is the promotion of the balanced development
and physical integration of the Plata Basin and the areas under its direct
and measurable influence. The treaty also enumerates a list of partial
objectives, and establishes an institutional framework to coordinate future
cooperation.
While the few concrete achievements to date indicate that the broad
objectives of the treaty were not accomplished, the institutional framework has been implemented, and no party has denounced the validity of
the treaty provisions. The institutional framework, and the agreement in
principle to integrated river basin development, are concrete instruments
of cooperation whose importance cannot be denied on the basis of failures
in subsequent integrating actions.
The Plata Basin Treaty is a result of both the common acceptance by
all the Plata nations of the mutual advantages of international cooperation
in basin development, and of the particular ways in which the treaty
provisions allayed the apprehensions of some states and allowed the
establishment of a cooperative undertaking. The first of these two factors
has been generally recognized in the literature on integrated development
in the basin.' In opposition, the role of risk management techniques in
the treaty has not been the subject of previous studies. A cause of this
62. R. Bilder, supra note 25, at 54.
63. See supra text accompanying note 35.
64. See generally INTAL 11,supra note 19; Hayton, supra note 23; Levin, supra note 19; Day,
supra note 19, both papers; A. Cdspedes, supra note 19.
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circumstance is that a general body of theory on that aspect of international
treaty making does not exist. Bilder attempted to start filling that gap.'
The risk management techniques that were identified in this study as
utilized in the Plata Basin Treaty can be considered requirements of the
final agreement. This results from the international environment of distrust
and uncertainty which was characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s in the
basin. Thus, those techniques were instrumental in achieving the agreement. They include a nonbinding arrangement, the division of the agreement and inclusion of secondary matters, a provision for unilateral
denunciation, the unanimity requirement in collective decisionmaking,
and an "agreement to agree" on the ways of implementing future cooperation in many important areas.
The use of risk management techniques may involve problems. The
techniques may be abused, or used to delay cooperation. Their most
important role in the Plata Basin development process, however, is their
function in making the agreement possible. The Plata Basin experience
does not demonstrate that the inclusion of secondary matters in the treaty
was a cause of the poor cooperative results achieved under the treaty
system during the 1969-1986 period. The provision for unilateral denunciation has not been used. The unanimity requirement is a reasonable
stance, a matter of fairness for sovereign nations, when decisions affecting
national interests are made. That provision cannot be blamed for failures
in attaining subsequent agreements.
Finally, the absence of important substantive agreements during the
life of the treaty is not a consequence of the "agreement to agree" component of the treaty which left many aspects of future cooperation unsettled. That absence is only a demonstration that the factors which precluded
the attainment of substantive agreement in important areas in 1969 did
not subsequently disappear. Between 1982 and 1985, new democratic
governments took office in Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. A
new era of cooperation is emerging among them, particularly between
Brazil and Argentina.' A new government was elected in Paraguay in
May 1989. If this political environment persists, the institutions created
under the Plata Basin Treaty can become instruments to promote increased
integration among the basin nations. A recent signal of positive change
is the decision taken at the 1986 Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting in
Buenos Aires, which assigned tasks of support, coordination, and execution of studies to the Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee Secretariat. These represent a moderate but progressive modification to this
system that produced few concrete results for almost two decades.
65. R. Bilder, supra note 25.
66. See, e.g., Acuerdos con Brasil sobre integraci6n y comercio, Clarn, July 30, 1986, at 110.

